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The 2012 National Congregations Study found that only 11.4% of the total clergy 
in the United States were women (ARDA 2012). As the congregation size grows, that 
number declines further, with data indicating only 3.4% of congregations with 1,000 or 
more members have a female leader. The number of women religious leaders increased 
by less than one percent between 1998 and 2012. These statistics work well to outline a 
phenomenon for female religious leaders, their inability to break the stained-glass 
ceiling.  
Many religious groups in the United States allow women to become ordained 
leaders. However, some of the largest religious denominations, such as the Roman 
Catholic Church, Southern Baptists, Mormons (Latter Day Saints), and the Orthodox 
Church do not allow women to become ordained or lead congregations (Masci 2020). If 
women are ordained, they often face subordinate positions and lead smaller, more rural 
congregations where they are paid less (Zikmund, Lummis, and Chang 1998). For 
example, the Orthodox Church does allow women to be ordained as maharats, or 
leaders of Jewish law but they are not allowed to be rabbis (Masci 2020). The purpose of 
this research is to examine how respondents feel about female religious leaders in the 
United States, and what factors determine more or less support. This work hypothesizes 
that heteronormative values that are still present within religious circles and American 








 In modern society, sex is at the basis of most interactions and has created the 
fundamental code in which people operate (Goffman 1977).  In the United States, society 
places a priority on three things, sex, race, and class (Rothenberg 2004). When children 
are born, they are placed into a sex class. This is the start of the socialization they will 
receive their entire lives, where the two groups receive different experiences and are 
placed under different societal expectations. These expectations include how to dress, 
act, and move through the world around them. They develop either masculine or 
feminine traits based on what they are taught is socially and societally appropriate. This 
is gender identity and follows the child for the rest of their life.  
For example, women in Western society are seen as fragile and pure objects. 
Their purpose is viewed as caring and loving for others which makes them vulnerable 
and creates their oppression. These expectations placed on women and men assume 
that one group does what the other is unable to do, essentially portraying them as 
opposites with different abilities or capacities (Rothenberg 2004). What may be seen as 
a positive trait for a man, is a negative or a sign of dysfunction for a woman.  In short, 
“...frailty is fitted to strength, gentleness to sternness, diffuse serving to project 
orientation, mechanical unknowingness to mechanical competencies, delicacy relative to 
contamination vs. insensitivity to contamination, and so forth” (Goffman 1977, 325). 
Simone de Beauvoir wrote that women are placed into a minority group, and the same 
standards discussed above force women to a destiny where she has to worship men and 
be subordinated (de Beauvoir 1949). She said that while men get to be the subject, 
women are forced to be the other. It asserts that she is inessential to the story of their 
lives, and serves three main roles - wife, mother, or guest entertainer. 
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 Queer theorists went on to look at gender as a societal construct and how this 
construct forces women to be subordinate to their male counterparts. Foucault argued 
that the body is and has always been shaped by society and that the idea of sex is 
pseudo-science (Foucault 1978). Society has constructed what is normal, and not 
normal sexual and gender identity through cultural power and control. It ostracizes 
those who conform and punishes those who do not. Judith Butler pointed out that sex 
and gender are different things (Butler 2011). Specifically, that sex and gender are both a 
societal construct, not something that is measurable. It is simply an idea that has been 
promoted over time and tells people in society what is acceptable and what is not. She 
says that gender is improvised and performative. While current discourse has begun to 
accept this idea and move towards viewing gender as a fluid and ever-changing concept, 
the lasting effects that have influenced the lives of women since the beginning of the 
modern world cannot be overlooked.  
Heteronormative Values in the United States  
 Betty Friedan outlined the heteronormative values lying dormant in the 1950’s 
United States in her book, The Feminine Mystique. When Friedan interviewed old 
Smith College classmates and found that many were unhappy with their role, that of 
wife and mother (Friedan 2010). She coined it as the “problem with no name”, one 
caused by women’s role being confined to the home, which oppressed them, kept them 
apart and kept them from seeing their potential. They were taught that if they tried to 
leave the home, it would betray their own femininity and their husband’s masculinity. 
Friedan wrote,  
“The problem lay buried, unspoken, for many years in the minds of American women. It 
was a strange stirring, a sense of dissatisfaction, a yearning that women suffered in the 
middle of the twentieth century in the United States. Each suburban wife struggled with 
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it alone. As she made the beds, shopped for groceries, matched slipcover material, ate 
peanut butter sandwiches with her children, chauffeured Cub Scouts, and Brownies, lay 
beside her husband at night - she was afraid to ask even herself the silent question - “Is 
this all?” (Friedan 1963, 57).  
 
While this seems like an ancient idea, one that went out with 1950’s Jell-O molds, more 
recent research suggests that these normative ideals are still dictating women’s lives 
today.  
 Heteronormativity is defined as an overarching ideology that rewards people in 
society for conforming to gender conventionality, heterosexuality, and creating 
traditional families (Oswald, Blume, and Marks 2005). This is not something that is 
naturally occurring, it is an organized social institution that controls and dominates 
society (Ingraham 1994). Heteronormativity not only dictates gender but familial 
structure.  
The discourse surrounding the idea of family is heteronormative, and natural 
privilege occurs for traditional family structures where there is one mom, one dad, and 
their children (Hudak and Giammattei 2014).  It also affects sexuality. For men 
especially, heterosexuality is seen as compulsory (Javaid 2018). It influences society to 
see heterosexuality as something that is acceptable and public, and homosexuality is 
unacceptable and private. While society knows and understands the existence of 
homosexuality, they accept it only when it is held to the private sphere. This, like gender 
identity, is formed during childhood. Children develop in accordance with the template 
set for them by society (Bem 1983). The effects of this led to women being denied entry 
into certain fields and obtaining higher career objectives.  
Heteronormative values reward women for being submissive, subordinate, and 
remaining in the private sphere. This phenomenon is referred to as the glass ceiling, 
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where women are kept from obtaining certain experiences because of their gender 
(Cotter et al. 2001). This has kept women from obtaining goals and had led them to lag 
behind in many measures of economic equality through stealth effects on things like the 
economic transactions in labor markets, household resource allocation, and government 
spending (Pettit and Hook 2009; Seguino 2011). Women spend nearly twice as much 
time as men doing domestic work. Due to their increased domestic obligations, they 
have poorer labor market outcomes than women without children.  
Religion and Heteronormativity  
 One sphere in which these norms are particularly prominent is the religious 
sphere. In general, high levels of religious belief and heteronormativity have a 
significant negative relationship to social tolerance (Henshaw 2014).  In addition, the 
less religious a society is, the more gender equality there is and countries with the 
highest amount of gender equality are where a majority of the inhabitants are without a 
religious affiliation (Klingorova and Havlicek 2015; Schnabel 2016). Levels of religious 
devoutness have also been found to affect gender norms, specifically leading to higher 
levels of agreement with traditional familial roles, extrafamilial roles, gender 
stereotypes, and gender role preference (Morgon 1987).  
More recent research shows that as men’s sexist views increase, so does their 
agreement with the tenets of Christianity (Maltby and Anderson 2010). Families that are 
more religious also have more traditional gendered socialization (Kelley et al. 1997). 
This is done through the teachings of the church. For example, religious instruction 
promotes a skewed power dynamic in marriage, justifying it with teachings about 
women’s role in the home and society, best described as complementarian (Perry and 
Grubbs 2020). The further explanation resides in the bestowal of opportunities and 
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privileges from the church, justified by the church (Bartowski and Shah 2014). This is 
evident in gender ideologies, gendered institutions, gendered interactions, and gender 
identity. Additionally, when people adhere strictly to religion, simultaneously 
legitimizes separate public and private spheres and maternalistic orientations.  
This is further justified from leaders, and literalist interpretation of scripture 
such as 1 Peter 2:11-12 or Ephesians 5:22, which prohibits women holding positions of 
power (Bendroth 2001; Chaves 1997). This can be seen in women themselves as well. As 
their religion becomes more hierarchical, their views on gender become more traditional 
(Baker and Whitehead 2016; Eliason et al. 2017). They show increases in “...body shame, 
self-silencing behaviors, hostile sexism, and benevolent sexism” (Eliason et al. 2017, 3).  
In order to take a more active role in the church and secure their position, they take on a 
literalist schema as a compensatory control mechanism (Brasher 1998; Giddens 1984; 
Griffith 1997; Hoffmann and Bartowski 2008; Pevey, Williams, and Ellison 1996; Stacey 
and Gerard 1990; Wolkomir 2004). These effects go beyond the church, affecting 
women’s health. Research shows that in the Southern U.S. church communities take 
away women’s empowerment and sexual confidence because of gender norms, which 
contributes to declining sexual health and HIV spread (Piper et al. 2020). What is even 
more concerning, is women’s subordination in the church and their lack of access to 
leadership roles despite their dedication and literalist worldview.  
Women Clergy and the Stained-Glass Ceiling 
 While women are dedicated to their religious institutions, they rarely hold on to 
leadership roles and have been unable to break the stained-glass ceiling (Chaves 1997; 
Djupe and Oldson 2013). They are accepted in these spheres but face consistent 
subordination (Sullins 2000). The previous theory claimed that as more women were 
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ordained the disparities and patriarchal nature would decline, but instead, statistics 
show that while there are women clergy, they are over-represented in subordinate 
positions with lower status (Sullins 2000). Prior research indicates that this was a 
consistent trend over time, throughout their career and only in congregational positions. 
So while they are ordained in the churches, they are not comparable to clergymen 
(Lummis and Nesbitt 2000). In addition, when women invest in religious organizations, 
they rarely receive the same payouts as men (Djupe, Sokhey, and Gilbert 2007; Friesen 
and Djupe 2017). Other research shows that even when they do get ordained and find 
positions as the head of the clergy, they face additional challenges (Zikmund, Lummis, 
and Chang 1998). As in the field as a whole, they are typically unemployed or 
underemployed. They are typically underemployed, and in rural areas, because the 
richer, older, members in large urban congregations prefer a male leader, and they sway 
hiring decisions. When women are hired, they have a more difficult time finding work-
life balance because of the heteronormative societal expectations of women, especially if 
they are single. When they are single in rural areas, they have a hard time meeting 
people on top of increased expectations from their parishioners without sufficient 
reasoning for boundaries.  
 When they are able to secure clergy positions, they are able to bring a more 
united, inclusive, and reflective approach to their leadership role (Lummis and Nesbitt 
2000). They run their congregation differently, and it works to break down the 
heteronormative ideals that are present in religious circles.  
Hypothesis 
 Previous research has looked at the challenges that women pastors face if they 
are even able to break through the stained-glass ceiling. Overall, they assert that they are 
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often underemployed, unemployed, take on smaller congregations, and get paid less 
(Zikmund, Lummis, and Chang 1998). Women are rarely allowed to hold leadership 
positions in churches (Chaves 1997; Djupe and Oldson 2013). They are generally over-
represented in subordinate positions with little to no power (Sullins 2000). These 
researchers demonstrate the difficulty women are facing in achieving equality in the 
religious sphere. What is important to look at is the effect of religion itself on keeping 
them in subordinate positions.  
This lag in equality is because of the relationship between religion and 
heteronormative values (Kelley and Dirk De Graaf 1997; Perry and Grubbs 2020). 
Societies that are more religious, have less gender equality (Schnabel 2016). Scholars 
believe that this is due to religious socialization causing people to see social issues as a 
problem within the individual, not with society (Weiner 1993). In short, one’s religious 
affiliation can determine how they feel on a wide range of political opinions - the most 
notable being abortion (Lindsey, Sigillo, and Miller 2013). The more one practices their 
religion orthodoxically, the less likely they are to support or have positive attitudes 
toward abortion (Mavor and Gallois 2008; Medoff and Lee 1992; Putney & Middleton 
1961). This displays itself in political affiliation, where Democrats and Republicans 
differ on their opinion regarding the morality of abortion (Hess and Rueb 2005).  
Women’s ability to advance in society is directly related to their ability to control 
their own fertility, which includes access to abortion (Crane and Smith 2006). In short, 
women’s ability to gain more time and traction in the workplace requires their ability to 
control their reproductive system, and decide when and when not to have a child 
(Pillard 2006). This control allows them to leave the private sphere and enter the public 
one because they do not have to stay home and mother young children. Former 
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Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg pointed out that women having the ability 
to decide to have children is the same as giving them equal citizenship (Ginsburg 1984). 
This control has allowed them to change their role in society from wife and mother to 
virtually anything they choose. It gives them more control over their political, economic, 
and social life while allowing them to establish themselves in the public sphere (Siegel 
2013).  
Arguments against abortion oftentimes take on a paternalistic air, meaning that 
they articulate that abortion harms women, and it is unjustifiable (Mayans and Vaca 
2017). It assumes that women need protection, even from their own right to 
reproductive control. This aligns with religion, because the argument that they are 
submissive and childlike creatures that require protection, is also one that religious 
groups promote in terms of women’s role in society and marriage. When religion itself is 
promoted and orthodoxically followed, as does women’s infantilization and 
participation in primarily the private sphere. This anti-abortion sentiment, and women 
in subordinate positions outside of the home, come from the same paternalistic 
argument.  
This research seeks to see the relationship between religion and other 
identification factors on gender roles, and women in leadership positions in the church.  
Socialization is the combination of values, beliefs, opinions, attitudes, and actions that 
become fundamental parts of our everyday lives (Anderson and Zyhowski 2017). 
Research has shown that when children come from homes where their mother is a single 
parent, or they have a mother who works, they are more likely to have more liberal ideas 
of gender and leftist policy views (Bertrand 2019). If the home has strong, and orthodox 
religious values, it could suggest a less positive view of gender equality and women in 
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positions of power. The sphere itself promotes conservative values that promote the idea 
of women as frail, submissive, creatures, and describes their rightful place as one in the 
home or private sphere (Bendroth 2001; Chaves 1997). Women are essentially trying to 
achieve equality in a sphere that, at times, promotes ideas that keep them out of the 
workplace in general.  
This work hypothesizes that a majority of the population is supportive of women 
holding positions of power and control in the church, but as the level of power increases, 
the level of support will as well. In addition, this work hypothesizes that like other social 
issues, higher levels of education, and income will create higher levels of support for 
women holding positions of power in the church setting. The above research asserts that 
religion has an effect on its members, creating more conservative opinions both 
politically and in regarding to gender. This sphere has remained one that women have 
been unable to infiltrate and achieve equality. In a culture that, at times, promotes the 
subordination of women, this research seeks to find, what is keeping women from 
breaking that stained-glass ceiling? 
 
Data and Methods 
 The data for this research was collected in a survey format from March 23-27, 
2020. The total sample size for this survey was 3,100. It was collected through Qualtrics 
Panels. Qualtrics Panels recruits from a variety of panel maintainers and uses a non-
probability quota system set by Census Bureau distributions on age, race, region, and 
gender (Boas et al. 2020).  The survey included questions about the respondent’s views 
on politics, the role of women in the church, and general questions regarding their 
gender, location, income, and other identifying questions.  
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In order to see how respondents varied on the role of women in the church, the 
survey asked them four questions. The questions ranged from little to complete control 
over the congregation. The first was whether or not the respondent felt that women 
should be able to teach Sunday School or religious education classes, the second was 
whether or not the respondent felt that women should be able to lead congregational 
singing, the third was whether they felt that women should be able to preach at women’s 
conferences or retreats, and the fourth was whether or not they felt that women should 
be able to preach from behind the pulpit on Sundays. This was supposed to confirm the 
hypothesis of this paper, that as the amount of power being held went up, the levels of 
support would decrease. If this paper’s hypothesis is correct, the data would indicate a 
decline in the amount of support along with that range. In addition, looking at the basic 
identifying factors along with political party preference, gender, education, marital 
status, income, biblical interpretation, church attendance, age, region in which they live, 
and their opinion on the nation becoming too feminized and weak.  
Findings 
Identification Factors and Support  
 The first set of analyses examined how various identification factors affected the 
levels of support for women in the positions of power in the church. This was done to 
see what characteristics lead to less support for women in power. Figure one examines 
the effect of gender. The trend amongst the graphs shows that women are consistently 
more supportive than men. Men support women teaching Sunday School at 
approximately 80.9%, leading congregational singing at 76.7%, preach during women’s 
conferences or retreats at 76.9%, and allowing them to preach from the pulpit at about 
72%. Women support other women teaching Sunday school at 85.2%, leading 
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congregational singing at about 83.8%, preaching during women’s conferences or 
retreats at 81.8%, and preaching from the pulpit at 77.9%.  
 Figure two shows the effect of marital status on levels of support. In general, 
married and widowed people showed the highest levels of support. Married people 
supported the Sunday school variable at 88%, the congregational singing variable at 
85.1%, the women’s retreat variable at 84.5%, and the pulpit variable at 78.3%. The 
single people supported the Sunday school variable at 78.6%, the congregational singing 
variable at 76%, the women’s retreat variable at 73.8%, and the pulpit variable at 72.3%. 
Divorced respondents supported the Sunday school variable at 88%, the congregational 
singing variable at 86.2%, the women’s retreat variable at 85.5%, and the pulpit variable 
at 79.4%. The widowed people supported the Sunday school variable at 92.4%, the 
congregational singing variable at about 93.3%, the women’s retreat variable at 91.6%, 
and the pulpit variable at 89.1%. This divide between the marital statuses is notable and 
provides a topic for discussion later in the paper. 
 Figure three examines the effect of race on variable support. In general, the white 
portion of the sample showed the greatest level of support across each of the four 
leadership scenarios, followed by the other three groups. The white part of the sample 
supported the Sunday school question at about 87.4%, the congregational singing 
variable at about 85.3%, the women’s retreat variable at 84.5%, and the pulpit variable 
at 79.1%. The black portion of the sample supported the Sunday school variable at 
74.9%, the congregational singing variable at 70.8%, the women’s retreat variable at 
67%, and the pulpit variable at 67.8%.  The Hispanic part of the sample supported the 
Sunday school variable at 82.1%, the congregational singing variable at 75.5%, the 
women’s retreat variable at 78.8%, and the pulpit variable at 72.2%. The Asian part of 
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the sample showed support for the Sunday school variable at about 83%, the 
congregational singing variable at 81%, the women’s retreat variable at about 76%, and 
the pulpit variable at 77%. 
 The fourth figure looked at the varying levels of support for the different religious 
identities. This analysis is important because it seeks to see if the followers of these 
religions are generally supportive of women in positions of church power. It suggests 
potential further change. The Protestant group had an average support level of 87.6%, 
the Catholic group had an average support level of 80.4%, the Mormon group had an 
average support level of 81.6%, the Orthodox sample had an average support level of 
64.7%, the other Christian group had an average support level of 77.2%, the Jewish 
sample had an average support level of  87.7 %, the Muslim sample had an average 
support level of 72.4%, the Buddhist sample had an average support level of 78.5%, the 
Hindu sample had an average support level of 67.2%, the Sikh sample had an average 
support level of 46.9%, the Atheist had an average support level of 74.2%, the Agnostic 
sample had an average support level of 88.9%, the nothing in particular sample had an 
average support level of 73.5%, and the all others sample had an average support level of 
72.1%. This analysis showed that the support was from lowest to highest, Sikh, 
Orthodox, Hindu, All Others, Muslim, Nothing in Particular, Atheist, Other Christian, 
Buddhist, Catholic, Mormon, Protestant, Jewish, and Agnostic.  
 The next analysis, figure five, looked at the education level. It showed that as the 
respondent’s education level increased, as did their support for women in positions of 
church power. The less than high school sample had an average support level of  72.2%, 
the high school education or GED sample had an average support of 76.7%, some college 
or trade school sample had an average support of 81.8%, the four-year college degree 
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sample had an average support of 84.2%, and the graduate education sample had an 
average support of 85.5%. This analysis confirms the hypothesis of this thesis, which 
states that as the respondent’s education level increases, as does their support for 
gender equality in religious institutions.  
 Figure six looks at the effect of church attendance. This showed that respondents 
who reported attending church more than once a week had an average support level of 
79.5%, respondents who reported attending once a week were at 80.5%, respondents 
who reported attending a few times a month were at 75.8%, respondents who reported 
attending a few times a year were at 83.4%, people who reported seldomly attending 
were at 78.9%, and respondents who reported never attending were at 78.9%. The 
analysis showed that there is not a consistent trend amongst attendance. People who 
reported attending a few times a month were less supportive than people who reported 
attending once a week, or a few times a week. There was little correlation between more 
attendance and less support for traditional gender roles.  
 Figure seven examined the effect of attention to politics on levels of support. It 
showed that people who pay more attention to politics, also are more supportive of 
women in those positions of authority. People who pay a great deal of attention to 
politics had an average support level of 89.5%, and people who pay no attention to 
politics were only at 57.8%. This provides an interesting topic for discussion, as well. 
Because religious institutions and religious leaders occasionally serve as political 
influencers, it is interesting that the people who pay more attention and are perhaps 
more involved by proxy show more liberal ideas of gender.  
Figure eight shows the breakdown of support amongst the four regions of the 
United States. These show that there are virtually little to no differences amongst the 
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Northwest, South, and Midwest, but slightly increased levels of support in the West. 
This is interesting and provides a further topic of discussion. The natural inclination 
would be to assume a difference between the South, and Northwest parts of the United 
States because of the increased conservatism in the South, and increased religiosity. 
However, this is not the case. There are little to no differences across the regions and 


























































The next set of analyses examines the relationship between education and 
support for women teaching Sunday school. The regression shows that for women with a 
high school diploma or less, the likelihood of support was approximately 85%, while 
women with some college or higher are even more likely at about 89%. The difference 
for men was even more apparent. Men with a high school diploma or less had a 
likelihood of support at about 79%, while men with some college or more had about 
87%. For women, it was a 4% difference, while for men it was 8%. The next analysis 
looked at the effect of education on the congregational singing variable. This showed 
that men with a high school education or less were at about 77%, while men with a 
college education or higher were at about 82%. Women with a high school education or 
lower were at about 84%, while women who had some college education or higher were 
at 89%. This was a 5% difference for men and a 5% difference for women. The next 
analysis looked at the effect of education on the women’s retreat variable. It showed that 
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men with a high school education or less were at about 74% and men with some college 
or higher 83%. Women with a high school education or less were at about 81%, and 
women with some college or more were at about 87%. That is a 9% difference for men 
and a 6% difference for women. The last analysis for the education regression looked at 
the pulpit variable. This showed that men with a high school education or less had a 
likelihood of support at about 71%, and men with some college or more were at about 
77%. Women with a high school education or less were at about 78%, while women with 
some college or higher were at about 84%. That is a 6% difference for men and 6% for 
women. That is an average difference of 7% for men, and 5.25% difference for women. 
Overall, these analyses show that as education increases, as does support for women in 

































Regression: Bible Interpretation 
 The next analyses looked at how the respondents felt about women in positions of 
church power, and how they felt about biblical interpretation. The survey asked them 
whether they thought that the bible should be interpreted literally, as in word for word, 
or in a more theoretical sense. The first analysis, figure 13, shows that men from the 
sample who believed in a literal interpretation believed that women should be allowed 
to teach Sunday school at a likelihood of around 86%, while ones who believed in a 
different interpretation were at about 78%. For women, this ranged from 87% to 84%. 
This was the opposite effect expected from this study. However, for the other analyses, 
the women in the sample showed more likelihood of support for the varying power 
positions if they also believed in a theoretical interpretation. The male portion of the 
sample continued the trend from the first analysis across the rest. They had higher levels 































Regression: Too Feminized and Weak 
 The next set of analyses looked at how the respondents felt about the nation’s 
current persona. The survey asked the respondents if they felt that the nation was 
becoming too feminized and weak. This question aimed at asking respondents if they 
held any sexist values. The Sunday school analysis showed little difference between the 
groups across both genders. Women showed slightly more likelihood of support if they 
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agreed that the nation was becoming too feminized and weak. That trend held in the 
congregational singing analysis,  the women’s retreat analysis, and the pulpit analysis. 
For men, there was very little difference between the agree and disagree group until the 
pulpit analysis. In the pulpit analysis, men who agreed that the nation was becoming too 
feminized and weak were more likely to agree that women should be able to preach from 
behind the pulpit on Sundays. Overall, the group that showed the least amount of 
support across the four analyses was the sample that neither agreed nor disagreed with 












































 The next set of analyses examined the effect of age on the four categories of 
church power. The Sunday school analysis showed an increased likelihood of support as 
the respondent’s age increases. However, the female part of the sample outpaces the 
male part of the sample at about 28. The congregational singing analysis shows a similar 
trend where the likelihood of support increases as the respondent’s age increases. The 
women’s retreat analysis shows a similar tread where the female sample outpaces the 
male sample at about 30. In addition, the relationship is not as positive or distinct in 
this analysis and starts to level off. The last analysis has the same trend as the first three 
for the female sample but has little to no effect on the male sample. This is an 







































 The next set of analyses looks at the effect of income on the likelihood of support 
for women in positions of church power. All four analyses show a consistent trend. They 
indicate that as the respondent’s income level rises, as does the support. For women, 
this effect is slightly stronger, as is indicated by the consistent slope and positive 
relationship. For men, the relationship is less strong. In the congregational singing 
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analysis particularly, the line levels off. Women also have a consistently higher 



























Regression: Church Attendance 
 
 The next set of analyses examined race and church attendance. Across all of the 
analyses, the white part of the sample has a higher likelihood of support across all four 
power analyses. The black part of the sample and the remaining racial groups have 
lower likelihoods of support. In addition, there is not a consistent trend amongst the 
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different church attendance levels. This indicates that there is little correlation between 
support for women in positions of authority and church attendance. This lack of 
correlation is interesting and provides an opportunity for further analysis as does the 





















Regression: Party Identification 
 
 The last set of analyses look at the effect of party identification. Because the 
church, at times, serves as a political arena, this provided an interesting view on this 
effect. In the first analysis, the Sunday school analysis, the Democrat and Republican 
sample see a decline in support as the attendance variable increases. The congregational 
singing and women’s retreat analysis shows that for the Republican sample, support 
goes down as attendance goes up. But for the Democrat and Independent sample, the 
level of support increases as attendance increases. For the last analysis, all three groups 
see an increase in support as attendance goes up. This indicates that for the pulpit 
analysis, all three groups see an increase of support as their attendance increases. This 
indicates that their amount of support does change as attendance changes, and that 
varies amongst parties. In addition, the Independent portion of the sample has less 
support across the analyses and seems to be less affected by attendance level, except in 
























 Four main points of the findings of this paper emerge for further analysis. The 
first is the religious breakdown and the causes, the second is the racial divide, the third 
is the marital and single divide, and the fourth is age. These topics deserve more 
consideration because they remain an explanation for lack of support, or present an 
interesting explanatory factor that could warrant further research.  
 In the breakdown of support amongst the different religious groups accounted for 
in this study, some were generally more supportive than others. The backgrounds of 
these religions provide an explanation for the demonstrated support or lack of support. 
The Sikh group had an average support level across the measures of 46.9%, orthodox 
followers were at 64.7%, Hindus were at 67.2%, all others were at 72.1%, Muslims were 
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at 72.4%, people without a religion were at 73.5%, Atheists were at 74.2%, other 
Christians were at 77.2%, Buddhists were at 78.5%, Catholics were at 80.4%, Mormons 
were at 81.6%, Protestants were at 87.6%, Jewish people were at 87.7%, and Agnostics 
were at 88.9%. While the Sikh religion allows and encourages women to take on any 
leadership role a man does, the statistics suggest a lack of support for their position of 
power (USC 2016). The Sikh religion does not have a true set of clergy, but it seems that 
a male preference still exists for leadership. The orthodox church does not ordain or 
allow women, which could explain the low support level. However, some of the highest 
support levels are churches that do not ordain or allow women to lead, as do most 
protestant religions (Masci 2020). The Catholic, Jewish, and Mormon samples had high 
support levels across the measures. This indicates a desire for more gender equality in 
those spaces where it currently does not exist. However, this also shows that for some 
religions, their low support levels can be attributed to the fact that their religion does 
not allow women to lead congregations and promotes heteronormative values that 
encourage women to remain in the private sphere. However, for some, and some of the 
highest groups, it is an indicator of a desire for women in positions of church power as 
leaders where there are not any. This research can serve as an indicator of those 
religious affiliations that their followers are ready for and support gender equality in 
that sphere. While this does not negate the struggle of women to become ordained 
religious leaders and the underemployment or unemployment they experience, it does 
suggest potential future change driven by followers specifically in the Catholic, Mormon, 
and Jewish faiths.  
 The second finding that deserves more attention is the racial divide in the 
analyses. The analyses showed a divide in support amongst the white and black parts of 
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the sample. A potential explanation for this is the religious breakdown of these groups, 
or the educational or income divide. The regression analysis showed that parts of the 
sample that had higher income levels or education levels had higher levels of potential 
support for women in leadership positions in churches. Further analysis of the dataset 
showed that the religious breakdown of the white part of the sample was 23.4% 
Protestant, and 24% Catholic. The breakdown of the black part of the sample 33.3% 
identified as other Christian, which in this survey included the Baptist option. The 
largest percentage of respondents that chose the other Christian option chose either the 
n/a option or the Baptist option. 25.4% of the Baptist option consisted of the black 
sample. This work suggests that this could be one of the underlying causes. In addition, 
the white part of the sample has a higher income level than the black sample. The 
regression analysis showed that as income rises, as does support. This could also be a 
possible explanation. Also, they have a slightly higher education level mean. The 
education analysis also indicated that there is a relationship between higher education 
levels and support. All three of these findings could indicate the divide.  
 The third point of analysis that needs further discussion is the divide between the 
marital and single samples. The analyses of support and marital status showed that 
marital people are more supportive across the analyses than single people. This was the 
opposite of the effect that was expected. Because the single part of the sample is 
typically younger, it was expected that the young people would drive the sample with a 
more leftist view of gender. However, previous research suggests that having children 
changes how one feels about the world tremendously (Elder and Greene 2008). 
Specifically, when one has a child it raises their concern about the world around them, 
including health, safety, education, and opportunity. It also creates a unique liberalizing 
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effect. Things like the gender gap and social welfare become more apparent. This effect 
could be attributed to this phenomenon. It is possible that when the married portion of 
the sample, likely with children, saw those questions is a personal light. They want their 
children to have every chance possible, and the questions shed light on inequality in the 
religious arena. Another explanation could be that they are older, make more money, 
and have a higher education level. The survey showed that 80.9% of the married sample 
have some college or higher. Only 68.8% of the single sample have some college or 
higher. The income data shows a similar trend. 69.9% of the married sample make 
$50,000 or more a year, while only 33.2% of the single sample makes that much. This 
further confirms the continuing theme that higher levels of income and education lead 
to higher levels of support, and that there is a definite child effect on one's political and 
world outlook.  
 The fourth point of further discussion involves age. I originally thought that there 
would be a negative relationship between age and support for women in religious 
positions of power. However, this turned out to not be the case. Women saw a consistent 
increase in support amongst all measures, and men saw them in all but less so in the 
pulpit measurement. Previous research suggested that one mellows on social issues as 
they age (Burge 2020). This particular research identified the relationship between age 
and feelings about abortion. Burge found that as one ages, their support for abortion 
seems to trend slightly upward. This could be a result of that same effect. As with their 
feelings on abortion, older Americans could be softening on the issue. In addition, there 
could be an additional effect of increasing education level and income. The regression 
analyses showed that as income and education increased levels of support. These results 




Overall, the surprising findings within this paper can be explained through 
further analysis of the data set and consultation of previous research.  
  
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, this work analyzed the national support levels for women in 
positions of church power. It ran analyses to determine what causes higher or lower 
levels of support and posed questions for further analysis and future research. The 
regression analyses showed that as education level and income level rise, as does the 
respondent’s likelihood of support for women in positions of church power or authority. 
In addition, there are distinct racial and marital status divides amongst levels of 
support. The religious levels of support suggest a potential change for women in access 
to positions of authority and confirm existing struggles within specific religions. 
Additionally, the work showed that the more the respondent paid attention to politics, 
the more accepting they were of the four women in positions of power analyses. The 
biblical literalism analysis showed that for women, they had a higher likelihood of 
support if they believed in a theoretical interpretation, while men showed a higher 
likelihood of support if they believed in a literal interpretation. The analysis which 
incorporated the survey question asking respondents if the nation was becoming too 
feminized and weak showed that for women, they were more likely to support women in 
positions of church power if they also agreed with the statement. For men, there was 
little difference between the two on the first three analyses, but showed more support on 
the pulpit analysis if they also support a literal interpretation. These findings provide a 
framework for researching female clergy leaders and understanding the lag in equality 
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in religious circles. It also poses a format for surveying people about women clergy and 
future research.  
This work did have some limitations. In order to better this study, the initial 
survey could have had additional questions that targeted hostile and benevolent sexism. 
In order to see the root effects of this, it would have been necessary to look more closely 
at how the respondents felt about gender norms, and how closely they aligned 
themselves with heteronormative values. This would have helped attribute the lag in 
equality to specific ideals and types of sexism. In addition, it would have been helpful to 
have additional survey questions that asked respondents how they felt about women in 
other positions of power in male-dominated workplaces. This could have confirmed 
similar trends or indicated that the religious sphere has a unique trend. Further 
conclusions could have been reached if the survey had included policy opinion questions 
on various topics like abortion, immigration, income equality, and hiring quotas. This 
would have allowed us to see if there was a definite party effect and if being more leftist 
on certain policies creates higher likelihoods of support for women in positions of 
power.  
Future research could look at the racial divide in support, and examine the 
potential causes of that and the effect of various religious affiliations. In addition, it 
could assess the effect of benevolent and hostile sexism. Previous research has pointed 
out the effect of those types of sexism on the 2016 election and political participation, 
but it could also be a potential underlying effect for the stained-glass ceiling 
phenomena. Additionally, it would be interesting to see if this same effect applied to 
other fields. Using the same model of increasing levels of power and support survey 
questions would be ideal. Male-dominated fields like medicine, STEM, and law would be 
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starting points. It could indicate levels of sexism that still exist in American society. It 
would also be interesting to examine the effect between different policies and support 
for women in positions of power. This could indicate a larger effect between the party 
and the leftist policy. All of these avenues for further research would continue to 
demonstrate the difficulty in achieving gender equality in the United States, and suggest 
potential future change or stagnancy.  
Overall, this work proposes a method for measuring support for women clergy 
and continues the discussion of stained-glass ceiling obstacles. It also demonstrates the 
various levels of support for various identity groups and poses explanations for those 
support levels. In short, this work found that support levels for women clergy are high, 
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